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الرئيسية

الأخلاق، الجزء I، القضية 12

No attribute of substance can be conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided.

البرهان

The parts into which substance as thus conceived would be divided either will retain the nature of substance, or they will not. If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part will necessarily be infinite, and (by Prop. vi.) self--caused, and (by Prop. v.) will perforce consist of a different attribute, so that, in that case, several substances could be formed out of one substance, which (by Prop. vi.) is absurd. Moreover, the parts (by Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with their whole, and the whole (by Def. iv. and Prop. x.) could both exist and be conceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to be absurd. If we adopt the second alternative--namely, that the parts will not retain the nature of substance--then, if the whole substance were divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature of substance, and would cease to exist, which (by Prop. vii.) is absurd.

Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), مترجم عن اللاتينية بقلم R. H. M. Elwes.

نُشر أول مرة في The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza، المجلد II (London: George Bell and Sons، 1884).

هذه الترجمة خرجت من حماية حقوق النشر في الولايات المتحدة، حيث نُشرت سنة 1884، وفي كل مكان تكون فيه مدة الحماية هي حياة المؤلف زائد 100 سنة أو أقل؛ وتوفي مترجمها سنة 1892.

تقسيم الوحدات والعناوين وموضع الحواشي من وضع هذا الموقع.

النص الرقمي: Project Gutenberg eBook #3800