الأخلاق، الجزء I، القضية 31
The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, as will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to passive nature and not to active nature.
البرهان
By the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from other modes, such as love, desire, &c., and therefore (Def. v.) requiring to be conceived through absolute thought. It must (by Prop. xv. and Def. vi.), through some attribute of God which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be so conceived, that without such attribute it could neither be nor be conceived. It must therefore be referred to nature passive rather than to nature active, as must also the other modes of thinking. Q.E.D.
الحاشية
I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function, admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality: but, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of what is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act of understanding, than which nothing is more clearly perceived. For we cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of the act of understanding.
Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), مترجم عن اللاتينية بقلم R. H. M. Elwes.
نُشر أول مرة في The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza، المجلد II (London: George Bell and Sons، 1884).
هذه الترجمة خرجت من حماية حقوق النشر في الولايات المتحدة، حيث نُشرت سنة 1884، وفي كل مكان تكون فيه مدة الحماية هي حياة المؤلف زائد 100 سنة أو أقل؛ وتوفي مترجمها سنة 1892.
تقسيم الوحدات والعناوين وموضع الحواشي من وضع هذا الموقع.
النص الرقمي: Project Gutenberg eBook #3800