الأخلاق، الجزء III، القضية 49
Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive to be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than if it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.
البرهان
A thing which we conceive as free must (I. Def. vii.) be perceived through itself without anything else. If, therefore, we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, we shall therefore (III. xiii. note) love it or hate it, and shall do so with the utmost love or hatred that can arise from the given emotion. But if the thing which causes the emotion be conceived as acting by necessity, we shall then (by the same Def. vii. Part I.) conceive it not as the sole cause, but as one of the causes of the emotion, and therefore our love or hatred towards it will be less. Q.E.D.
الحاشية
Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselves to be free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards anything else: to this consideration we must add the imitation of emotions treated of in III. xxvii., xxxiv., xl. and xliii.
Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), مترجم عن اللاتينية بقلم R. H. M. Elwes.
نُشر أول مرة في The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza، المجلد II (London: George Bell and Sons، 1884).
هذه الترجمة خرجت من حماية حقوق النشر في الولايات المتحدة، حيث نُشرت سنة 1884، وفي كل مكان تكون فيه مدة الحماية هي حياة المؤلف زائد 100 سنة أو أقل؛ وتوفي مترجمها سنة 1892.
تقسيم الوحدات والعناوين وموضع الحواشي من وضع هذا الموقع.
النص الرقمي: Project Gutenberg eBook #3800