الأخلاق، الجزء IV، القضية 61
Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.
البرهان
Desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) considered absolutely is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself. Hence desire, which arises from reason, that is (III. iii.), which is engendered in us in so far as we act, is the actual essence or nature of man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are adequately conceived through man's essence only (III. Def. ii.). Now, if such desire could be excessive, human nature considered in itself alone would be able to exceed itself, or would be able to do more than it can, a manifest contradiction. Therefore, such desire cannot be excessive. Q.E.D.
Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), مترجم عن اللاتينية بقلم R. H. M. Elwes.
نُشر أول مرة في The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza، المجلد II (London: George Bell and Sons، 1884).
هذه الترجمة خرجت من حماية حقوق النشر في الولايات المتحدة، حيث نُشرت سنة 1884، وفي كل مكان تكون فيه مدة الحماية هي حياة المؤلف زائد 100 سنة أو أقل؛ وتوفي مترجمها سنة 1892.
تقسيم الوحدات والعناوين وموضع الحواشي من وضع هذا الموقع.
النص الرقمي: Project Gutenberg eBook #3800