Ethik, Teil III, Lehrsatz 58
Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active.
Beweis
When the mind conceives itself and its power of activity, it feels pleasure (III. liii.): now the mind necessarily contemplates itself, when it conceives a true or adequate idea (II. xliii.). But the mind does conceive certain adequate ideas (II. xl. note 2.). Therefore it feels pleasure in so far as it conceives adequate ideas; that is, in so far as it is active (III. i.). Again, the mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to persist in its own being (III. ix.); but by such an endeavour we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.); therefore, desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we understand, or (III. i.) in so far as we are active. Q.E.D.
Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), aus dem Lateinischen übersetzt von R. H. M. Elwes.
Erstmals veröffentlicht in The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, Bd. II (London: George Bell and Sons, 1884).
Diese Übersetzung ist gemeinfrei in den Vereinigten Staaten, wo sie im Jahr 1884 erschienen ist, und überall dort, wo die Schutzfrist des Urheberrechts die Lebenszeit des Urhebers plus 100 Jahre oder weniger beträgt; ihr Übersetzer starb im Jahr 1892.
Die Einteilung in Einheiten, die Überschriften und die Platzierung der Anmerkungen stammen von dieser Website.
Digitaler Text: Project Gutenberg eBook #3800