Ethik, Teil IV, Lehrsatz 61
Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.
Beweis
Desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) considered absolutely is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself. Hence desire, which arises from reason, that is (III. iii.), which is engendered in us in so far as we act, is the actual essence or nature of man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are adequately conceived through man's essence only (III. Def. ii.). Now, if such desire could be excessive, human nature considered in itself alone would be able to exceed itself, or would be able to do more than it can, a manifest contradiction. Therefore, such desire cannot be excessive. Q.E.D.
Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), aus dem Lateinischen übersetzt von R. H. M. Elwes.
Erstmals veröffentlicht in The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, Bd. II (London: George Bell and Sons, 1884).
Diese Übersetzung ist gemeinfrei in den Vereinigten Staaten, wo sie im Jahr 1884 erschienen ist, und überall dort, wo die Schutzfrist des Urheberrechts die Lebenszeit des Urhebers plus 100 Jahre oder weniger beträgt; ihr Übersetzer starb im Jahr 1892.
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