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Ética, Parte III, Proposición 16

Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given object has some point of resemblance with another object which is wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said emotions, we shall still regard the first--named object with love or hate.

Demostración

The point of resemblance was in the object (by hypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus (III. xiv.), when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it will straightway be affected by one or the other emotion, and consequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same point of resemblance, will be accidentally (III. xv.) a cause of pleasure or pain. Thus (by the foregoing Corollary), although the point in which the two objects resemble one another be not the efficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the first--named object with love or hate. Q.E.D.

Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), traducido del latín por R. H. M. Elwes.

Publicado por primera vez en The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, vol. II (London: George Bell and Sons, 1884).

Esta traducción es de dominio público en Estados Unidos, donde se publicó en 1884, y en cualquier lugar donde el plazo de derechos de autor sea la vida del autor más 100 años o menos; su traductor murió en 1892.

La división en unidades, los títulos y la ubicación de las notas son de este sitio.

Texto digital: Project Gutenberg eBook #3800