Ética, Parte III, Proposición 26
We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and, contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything which we conceive to affect it pleasurably.
Demostración
This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the foregoing proposition followed from III. xxi.
Escolio
Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man may easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and, contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object. This feeling is called pride, in reference to the man who thinks too highly of himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams with his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things that fall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon accounting them real, and exulting in them, so long as he is unable to conceive anything which excludes their existence, and determines his own power of action. Pride, therefore, is pleasure springing from a man thinking too highly of himself. Again, the pleasure which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called over--esteem. Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too little of a man is called disdain.
Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), traducido del latín por R. H. M. Elwes.
Publicado por primera vez en The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, vol. II (London: George Bell and Sons, 1884).
Esta traducción es de dominio público en Estados Unidos, donde se publicó en 1884, y en cualquier lugar donde el plazo de derechos de autor sea la vida del autor más 100 años o menos; su traductor murió en 1892.
La división en unidades, los títulos y la ubicación de las notas son de este sitio.
Texto digital: Project Gutenberg eBook #3800