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Ética, Parte IV, Proposición 56

Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit.

Demostración

The first foundation of virtue is self--preservation (IV. xxii. Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.). He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the foundation of all virtues, and consequently of all virtues. Again, to act virtuously is merely to act under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.): now he, that acts under the guidance of reason, must necessarily know that he so acts (II. xliii.). Therefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, and consequently of all virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue; in other words (IV. Def. viii.), is most infirm of spirit. Thus extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit. Q.E.D.

Corolario

Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and the dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions.

Escolio

Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride; for the latter being a pleasurable emotion, and the former a painful emotion, the pleasurable is stronger than the painful (IV. xviii.).

Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), traducido del latín por R. H. M. Elwes.

Publicado por primera vez en The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, vol. II (London: George Bell and Sons, 1884).

Esta traducción es de dominio público en Estados Unidos, donde se publicó en 1884, y en cualquier lugar donde el plazo de derechos de autor sea la vida del autor más 100 años o menos; su traductor murió en 1892.

La división en unidades, los títulos y la ubicación de las notas son de este sitio.

Texto digital: Project Gutenberg eBook #3800