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اخلاق, بخش III, تعریف عواطف 48

Lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual intercourse.

توضیح

Whether this desire be excessive or not, it is still called lust. These last five emotions (as I have shown in III. lvi.) have on contraries. For deference is a species of ambition. Cf. III. xxix. note. Again, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety, and chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of the mind. It may, nevertheless, happen, that an avaricious, an ambitious, or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating, drinking, or sexual indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fear are not contraries to luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery. For an avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with food and drink at another man's expense. An ambitious man will restrain himself in nothing, so long as he thinks his indulgences are secret; and if he lives among drunkards and debauchees, he will, from the mere fact of being ambitious, be more prone to those vices. Lastly, a timid man does that which he would not. For though an avaricious man should, for the sake of avoiding death, cast his riches into the sea, he will none the less remain avaricious; so, also, if a lustful man is downcast, because he cannot follow his bent, he does not, on the ground of abstention, cease to be lustful. In fact, these emotions are not so much concerned with the actual feasting, drinking, &c., as with the appetite and love of such. Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to these emotions, but high--mindedness and valour, whereof I will speak presently. The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind I pass over in silence, first, because they arise from the compounding of the emotions already described; secondly, because many of them have no distinctive names, which shows that it is sufficient for practical purposes to have merely a general knowledge of them. However, it is established from the definitions of the emotions, which we have set forth, that they all spring from desire, pleasure, or pain, or, rather, that there is nothing besides these three; wherefore each is wont to be called by a variety of names in accordance with its various relations and extrinsic tokens. If we now direct our attention to these primitive emotions, and to what has been said concerning the nature of the mind, we shall be able thus to define the emotions, in so far as they are referred to the mind only.

Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), ترجمه‌شده از لاتین به دست R. H. M. Elwes.

نخستین انتشار در The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza، جلد II (London: George Bell and Sons، 1884).

این ترجمه در ایالات متحده، که در سال 1884 در آن منتشر شد، و در هر جا که مدت حق مؤلف برابر با عمر نویسنده به‌علاوهٔ 100 سال یا کمتر باشد، از شمول حق مؤلف خارج است؛ مترجم آن در سال 1892 درگذشت.

تقسیم به واحدها، عنوان‌ها و جای یادداشت‌ها از آنِ این وب‌سایت است.

متن دیجیتال: Project Gutenberg eBook #3800