اخلاق, بخش III, قضیه 58
Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active.
برهان
When the mind conceives itself and its power of activity, it feels pleasure (III. liii.): now the mind necessarily contemplates itself, when it conceives a true or adequate idea (II. xliii.). But the mind does conceive certain adequate ideas (II. xl. note 2.). Therefore it feels pleasure in so far as it conceives adequate ideas; that is, in so far as it is active (III. i.). Again, the mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to persist in its own being (III. ix.); but by such an endeavour we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.); therefore, desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we understand, or (III. i.) in so far as we are active. Q.E.D.
Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), ترجمهشده از لاتین به دست R. H. M. Elwes.
نخستین انتشار در The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza، جلد II (London: George Bell and Sons، 1884).
این ترجمه در ایالات متحده، که در سال 1884 در آن منتشر شد، و در هر جا که مدت حق مؤلف برابر با عمر نویسنده بهعلاوهٔ 100 سال یا کمتر باشد، از شمول حق مؤلف خارج است؛ مترجم آن در سال 1892 درگذشت.
تقسیم به واحدها، عنوانها و جای یادداشتها از آنِ این وبسایت است.
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