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خانه

اخلاق, بخش IV, قضیه 51

Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree therewith and arise therefrom.

برهان

Approval is love towards one who has done good to another (Def. of the Emotions, xix.); therefore it may be referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active (III. lix.), that is (III. iii.), in so far as it understands; therefore, it is in agreement with reason, &c. Q.E.D.

برهانی دیگر

He, who lives under the guidance of reason, desires for others the good which he seeks for himself (IV. xxxvii.); wherefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellow his own endeavour to do good is aided; in other words, he will feel pleasure (III. xi. note) accompanied by the idea of the benefactor. Therefore he approves of him. Q.E.D.

تبصره

Indignation as we defined it (Def. of the Emotions, xx.) is necessarily evil (IV. xlv.); we may, however, remark that, when the sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace punishes a citizen who has injured another, it should not be said to be indignant with the criminal, for it is not incited by hatred to ruin him, it is led by a sense of duty to punish him.

Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), ترجمه‌شده از لاتین به دست R. H. M. Elwes.

نخستین انتشار در The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza، جلد II (London: George Bell and Sons، 1884).

این ترجمه در ایالات متحده، که در سال 1884 در آن منتشر شد، و در هر جا که مدت حق مؤلف برابر با عمر نویسنده به‌علاوهٔ 100 سال یا کمتر باشد، از شمول حق مؤلف خارج است؛ مترجم آن در سال 1892 درگذشت.

تقسیم به واحدها، عنوان‌ها و جای یادداشت‌ها از آنِ این وب‌سایت است.

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