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اخلاق, بخش IV, قضیه 61

Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.

برهان

Desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) considered absolutely is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself. Hence desire, which arises from reason, that is (III. iii.), which is engendered in us in so far as we act, is the actual essence or nature of man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are adequately conceived through man's essence only (III. Def. ii.). Now, if such desire could be excessive, human nature considered in itself alone would be able to exceed itself, or would be able to do more than it can, a manifest contradiction. Therefore, such desire cannot be excessive. Q.E.D.

Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), ترجمه‌شده از لاتین به دست R. H. M. Elwes.

نخستین انتشار در The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza، جلد II (London: George Bell and Sons، 1884).

این ترجمه در ایالات متحده، که در سال 1884 در آن منتشر شد، و در هر جا که مدت حق مؤلف برابر با عمر نویسنده به‌علاوهٔ 100 سال یا کمتر باشد، از شمول حق مؤلف خارج است؛ مترجم آن در سال 1892 درگذشت.

تقسیم به واحدها، عنوان‌ها و جای یادداشت‌ها از آنِ این وب‌سایت است.

متن دیجیتال: Project Gutenberg eBook #3800