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Éthique, Partie III, Proposition 26

We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and, contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything which we conceive to affect it pleasurably.

Démonstration

This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the foregoing proposition followed from III. xxi.

Scolie

Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man may easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and, contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object. This feeling is called pride, in reference to the man who thinks too highly of himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams with his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things that fall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon accounting them real, and exulting in them, so long as he is unable to conceive anything which excludes their existence, and determines his own power of action. Pride, therefore, is pleasure springing from a man thinking too highly of himself. Again, the pleasure which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called over--esteem. Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too little of a man is called disdain.

Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), traduit du latin par R. H. M. Elwes.

Publié pour la première fois dans The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, vol. II (London : George Bell and Sons, 1884).

Cette traduction est tombée dans le domaine public aux États-Unis, où elle a été publiée en 1884, ainsi que partout où la durée du droit d'auteur est la vie de l'auteur plus 100 ans ou moins ; son traducteur est décédé en 1892.

Le découpage en unités, les titres et la place des notes sont le fait de ce site.

Texte numérique : Project Gutenberg eBook #3800