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Éthique, Partie IV, Proposition 54

Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or infirm.

Démonstration

The first part of this proposition is proved like the foregoing one. The second part is proved from the mere definition of the emotion in question (Def. of the Emotions, xxvii.). For the man allows himself to be overcome, first, by evil desires; secondly, by pain.

Scolie

As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these two emotions, namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and Fear, bring more good than harm; hence, as we must sin, we had better sin in that direction. For, if all men who are a prey to emotion were all equally proud, they would shrink from nothing, and would fear nothing; how then could they be joined and linked together in bonds of union? The crowd plays the tyrant, when it is not in fear; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who consulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence. Indeed those who are a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than others to live under the guidance of reason, that is, to become free and to enjoy the life of the blessed.

Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), traduit du latin par R. H. M. Elwes.

Publié pour la première fois dans The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, vol. II (London : George Bell and Sons, 1884).

Cette traduction est tombée dans le domaine public aux États-Unis, où elle a été publiée en 1884, ainsi que partout où la durée du droit d'auteur est la vie de l'auteur plus 100 ans ou moins ; son traducteur est décédé en 1892.

Le découpage en unités, les titres et la place des notes sont le fait de ce site.

Texte numérique : Project Gutenberg eBook #3800