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אתיקה, חלק IV, משפט 30

A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in so far as it is contrary to our nature.

הוכחה

We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV. viii.), that is (by the Def., which see in III. xi. note), when it diminishes or checks our power of action. Therefore, if anything were bad for us through that quality which it has in common with our nature, it would be able itself to diminish or check that which it has in common with our nature, which (III. iv.) is absurd. Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through that quality which it has in common with us, but, on the other hand, in so far as it is bad for us, that is (as we have just shown), in so far as it can diminish or check our power of action, it is contrary to our nature. Q.E.D.

Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), תורגם מן הלטינית בידי R. H. M. Elwes.

פורסם לראשונה ב־The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, כרך II (London: George Bell and Sons, 1884).

תרגום זה חופשי מזכויות יוצרים בארצות הברית, שבה פורסם בשנת 1884, ובכל מקום שבו תקופת זכות היוצרים היא חיי המחבר ועוד 100 שנים או פחות; מתרגמו נפטר בשנת 1892.

חלוקת היחידות, הכותרות ומיקום ההערות הם של האתר הזה.

טקסט דיגיטלי: Project Gutenberg eBook #3800