אתיקה, חלק IV, משפט 61
Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.
הוכחה
Desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) considered absolutely is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself. Hence desire, which arises from reason, that is (III. iii.), which is engendered in us in so far as we act, is the actual essence or nature of man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are adequately conceived through man's essence only (III. Def. ii.). Now, if such desire could be excessive, human nature considered in itself alone would be able to exceed itself, or would be able to do more than it can, a manifest contradiction. Therefore, such desire cannot be excessive. Q.E.D.
Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), תורגם מן הלטינית בידי R. H. M. Elwes.
פורסם לראשונה ב־The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, כרך II (London: George Bell and Sons, 1884).
תרגום זה חופשי מזכויות יוצרים בארצות הברית, שבה פורסם בשנת 1884, ובכל מקום שבו תקופת זכות היוצרים היא חיי המחבר ועוד 100 שנים או פחות; מתרגמו נפטר בשנת 1892.
חלוקת היחידות, הכותרות ומיקום ההערות הם של האתר הזה.
טקסט דיגיטלי: Project Gutenberg eBook #3800