『エチカ』、第IV部、定理61
Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.
証明
Desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) considered absolutely is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself. Hence desire, which arises from reason, that is (III. iii.), which is engendered in us in so far as we act, is the actual essence or nature of man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are adequately conceived through man's essence only (III. Def. ii.). Now, if such desire could be excessive, human nature considered in itself alone would be able to exceed itself, or would be able to do more than it can, a manifest contradiction. Therefore, such desire cannot be excessive. Q.E.D.
Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), R. H. M. Elwesによるラテン語からの翻訳.
The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza、第II巻(London:George Bell and Sons、1884年)に初めて刊行されました。
この翻訳は、1884年に出版された米国では著作権の保護期間を過ぎており、保護期間が著作者の生存期間に100年を加えた期間以下であるすべての地域でも同様です。翻訳者は1892年に亡くなりました。
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