Ética, Parte IV, Proposição 23
Man, in so far as he is determined to a particular action because he has inadequate ideas, cannot be absolutely said to act in obedience to virtue; he can only be so described, in so far as he is determined for the action because he understands.
Demonstração
In so far as a man is determined to an action through having inadequate ideas, he is passive (III. i.), that is (III. Deff. i., and iii.), he does something, which cannot be perceived solely through his essence, that is (by IV. Def. viii.), which does not follow from his virtue. But, in so far as he is determined for an action because he understands, he is active; that is, he does something, which is perceived through his essence alone, or which adequately follows from his virtue. Q.E.D.
Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), traduzido do latim por R. H. M. Elwes.
Primeira publicação em The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, vol. II (London: George Bell and Sons, 1884).
Esta tradução está em domínio público nos Estados Unidos, onde foi publicada em 1884, e em todos os lugares onde o prazo de direitos autorais é a vida do autor mais 100 anos ou menos; seu tradutor morreu em 1892.
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