Этика, Часть I, Теорема 12
No attribute of substance can be conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided.
Доказательство
The parts into which substance as thus conceived would be divided either will retain the nature of substance, or they will not. If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part will necessarily be infinite, and (by Prop. vi.) self--caused, and (by Prop. v.) will perforce consist of a different attribute, so that, in that case, several substances could be formed out of one substance, which (by Prop. vi.) is absurd. Moreover, the parts (by Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with their whole, and the whole (by Def. iv. and Prop. x.) could both exist and be conceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to be absurd. If we adopt the second alternative--namely, that the parts will not retain the nature of substance--then, if the whole substance were divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature of substance, and would cease to exist, which (by Prop. vii.) is absurd.
Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), в переводе с латинского R. H. M. Elwes.
Впервые опубликовано в The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, т. II (London: George Bell and Sons, 1884).
Этот перевод не охраняется авторским правом в Соединённых Штатах, где он опубликован в 1884 году, и повсюду, где срок авторского права составляет жизнь автора плюс 100 лет или меньше; его переводчик умер в 1892 году.
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Цифровой текст: Project Gutenberg eBook #3800