Etika, IV. Kısım, Önerme 61
Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.
Kanıt
Desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) considered absolutely is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself. Hence desire, which arises from reason, that is (III. iii.), which is engendered in us in so far as we act, is the actual essence or nature of man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are adequately conceived through man's essence only (III. Def. ii.). Now, if such desire could be excessive, human nature considered in itself alone would be able to exceed itself, or would be able to do more than it can, a manifest contradiction. Therefore, such desire cannot be excessive. Q.E.D.
Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), Latince aslından çeviren R. H. M. Elwes.
İlk kez The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, cilt II içinde yayımlandı (London: George Bell and Sons, 1884).
Bu çeviri Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde — 1884 yılında yayımlandığı ülkede — ve telif hakkı süresinin yazarın yaşamı artı 100 yıl veya daha az olduğu her yerde kamu malıdır; çevirmeni 1892 yılında vefat etmiştir.
Birim ayırımları, başlıklar ve notların yerleşimi bu siteye aittir.
Dijital metin: Project Gutenberg eBook #3800