Etika, V. Kısım, Önerme 5
An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive simply, and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.
Kanıt
An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be free, is greater than one towards what we conceive to be necessary (III. xlix.), and, consequently, still greater than one towards what we conceive as possible, or contingent (IV. xi.). But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes whereby it has been determined to action (II. xxxv. note); therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply is, other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel towards what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and, consequently, it is the greatest of all. Q.E.D.
Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), Latince aslından çeviren R. H. M. Elwes.
İlk kez The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, cilt II içinde yayımlandı (London: George Bell and Sons, 1884).
Bu çeviri Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde — 1884 yılında yayımlandığı ülkede — ve telif hakkı süresinin yazarın yaşamı artı 100 yıl veya daha az olduğu her yerde kamu malıdır; çevirmeni 1892 yılında vefat etmiştir.
Birim ayırımları, başlıklar ve notların yerleşimi bu siteye aittir.
Dijital metin: Project Gutenberg eBook #3800