İçeriğe atla
Ana Sayfa

Etika, V. Kısım, Önerme 9

An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a single cause.

Kanıt

An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it hinders the mind from being able to think (IV. xxvi. xxvii.); therefore, an emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the contemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful than another equally powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind in the single contemplation of a few objects or of one, that it is unable to think of anything else; this was our first point. Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power (III. vii.), consists solely in thought (II. xi.), the mind is less passive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think of several things at once, than in regard to an equally strong emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few or of a single object: this was our second point. Lastly, this emotion (III. xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to several causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them. Q.E.D.

Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), Latince aslından çeviren R. H. M. Elwes.

İlk kez The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, cilt II içinde yayımlandı (London: George Bell and Sons, 1884).

Bu çeviri Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde — 1884 yılında yayımlandığı ülkede — ve telif hakkı süresinin yazarın yaşamı artı 100 yıl veya daha az olduğu her yerde kamu malıdır; çevirmeni 1892 yılında vefat etmiştir.

Birim ayırımları, başlıklar ve notların yerleşimi bu siteye aittir.

Dijital metin: Project Gutenberg eBook #3800