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《伦理学》,第III部分,情感的定义32

Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something, kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and at the same time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude the existence of it.

说明

When we remember a thing, we are by that very fact, as I have already said more than once, disposed to contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were something present; but this disposition or endeavour, while we are awake, is generally checked by the images of things which exclude the existence of that which we remember. Thus when we remember something which affected us with a certain pleasure, we by that very fact endeavour to regard it with the same emotion of pleasure as though it were present, but this endeavour is at once checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the existence of the thing in question. Wherefore regret is, strictly speaking, a pain opposed to that of pleasure, which arises from the absence of something we hate (cf. III. xlvii. note). But, as the name regret seems to refer to desire, I set this emotion down, among the emotions springing from desire.

Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), 由R. H. M. Elwes译自拉丁文.

首次出版于The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza,第II卷(London:George Bell and Sons,1884)。

本译文在美国已超出版权保护期(1884年出版于美国),在版权期限为作者终身加100年或更短的任何地方同样如此;其译者卒于1892年。

单元划分、标题和注释的位置均出自本站。

数字文本: Project Gutenberg eBook #3800