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《伦理学》,第IV部分,命题61

Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.

证明

Desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) considered absolutely is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself. Hence desire, which arises from reason, that is (III. iii.), which is engendered in us in so far as we act, is the actual essence or nature of man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are adequately conceived through man's essence only (III. Def. ii.). Now, if such desire could be excessive, human nature considered in itself alone would be able to exceed itself, or would be able to do more than it can, a manifest contradiction. Therefore, such desire cannot be excessive. Q.E.D.

Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), 由R. H. M. Elwes译自拉丁文.

首次出版于The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza,第II卷(London:George Bell and Sons,1884)。

本译文在美国已超出版权保护期(1884年出版于美国),在版权期限为作者终身加100年或更短的任何地方同样如此;其译者卒于1892年。

单元划分、标题和注释的位置均出自本站。

数字文本: Project Gutenberg eBook #3800