Ética, Parte I, Proposición 14
Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.
Demostración
As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied (by Def. vi.), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. xi.); if any substance besides God were granted, it would have to be explained by some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the same attribute would exist, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd; therefore, besides God no substance can be granted, or, consequently, be conceived. If it could be conceived, it would necessarily have to be conceived as existent; but this (by the first part of this proof) is absurd. Therefore, besides God no substance can be granted or conceived. Q.E.D.
Corolario 1
Clearly, therefore: 1. God is one, that is (by Def. vi.) only one substance can be granted in the universe, and that substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already indicated (in the note to Prop. x.).
Corolario 2
It follows: 2. That extension and thought are either attributes of God or (by Ax. i.) accidents (affectiones) of the attributes of God.
Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), traducido del latín por R. H. M. Elwes.
Publicado por primera vez en The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, vol. II (London: George Bell and Sons, 1884).
Esta traducción es de dominio público en Estados Unidos, donde se publicó en 1884, y en cualquier lugar donde el plazo de derechos de autor sea la vida del autor más 100 años o menos; su traductor murió en 1892.
La división en unidades, los títulos y la ubicación de las notas son de este sitio.
Texto digital: Project Gutenberg eBook #3800