Éthique, Partie I, Proposition 12
No attribute of substance can be conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided.
Démonstration
The parts into which substance as thus conceived would be divided either will retain the nature of substance, or they will not. If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part will necessarily be infinite, and (by Prop. vi.) self--caused, and (by Prop. v.) will perforce consist of a different attribute, so that, in that case, several substances could be formed out of one substance, which (by Prop. vi.) is absurd. Moreover, the parts (by Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with their whole, and the whole (by Def. iv. and Prop. x.) could both exist and be conceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to be absurd. If we adopt the second alternative--namely, that the parts will not retain the nature of substance--then, if the whole substance were divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature of substance, and would cease to exist, which (by Prop. vii.) is absurd.
Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), traduit du latin par R. H. M. Elwes.
Publié pour la première fois dans The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, vol. II (London : George Bell and Sons, 1884).
Cette traduction est tombée dans le domaine public aux États-Unis, où elle a été publiée en 1884, ainsi que partout où la durée du droit d'auteur est la vie de l'auteur plus 100 ans ou moins ; son traducteur est décédé en 1892.
Le découpage en unités, les titres et la place des notes sont le fait de ce site.
Texte numérique : Project Gutenberg eBook #3800