『エチカ』、第IV部、定理29
No individual thing, which is entirely different from our own nature, can help or check our power of activity, and absolutely nothing can do us good or harm, unless it has something in common with our nature.
証明
The power of every individual thing, and consequently the power of man, whereby he exists and operates, can only be determined by an individual thing (I. xxviii.), whose nature (II. vi.) must be understood through the same nature as that, through which human nature is conceived. Therefore our power of activity, however it be conceived, can be determined and consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other individual thing, which has something in common with us, but not by the power of anything, of which the nature is entirely different from our own; and since we call good or evil that which is the cause of pleasure or pain (IV. viii.), that is (III. xi. note), which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our power of activity; therefore, that which is entirely different from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad. Q.E.D.
Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), R. H. M. Elwesによるラテン語からの翻訳.
The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza、第II巻(London:George Bell and Sons、1884年)に初めて刊行されました。
この翻訳は、1884年に出版された米国では著作権の保護期間を過ぎており、保護期間が著作者の生存期間に100年を加えた期間以下であるすべての地域でも同様です。翻訳者は1892年に亡くなりました。
本文の区切り、見出し、注の配置は、このサイトによります。
デジタルテキスト: Project Gutenberg eBook #3800