『エチカ』、第IV部、定理30
A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in so far as it is contrary to our nature.
証明
We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV. viii.), that is (by the Def., which see in III. xi. note), when it diminishes or checks our power of action. Therefore, if anything were bad for us through that quality which it has in common with our nature, it would be able itself to diminish or check that which it has in common with our nature, which (III. iv.) is absurd. Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through that quality which it has in common with us, but, on the other hand, in so far as it is bad for us, that is (as we have just shown), in so far as it can diminish or check our power of action, it is contrary to our nature. Q.E.D.
Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), R. H. M. Elwesによるラテン語からの翻訳.
The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza、第II巻(London:George Bell and Sons、1884年)に初めて刊行されました。
この翻訳は、1884年に出版された米国では著作権の保護期間を過ぎており、保護期間が著作者の生存期間に100年を加えた期間以下であるすべての地域でも同様です。翻訳者は1892年に亡くなりました。
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