Etika, I. Kısım, Önerme 25
God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.
Kanıt
If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the essence of things; and therefore the essence of things can (by Ax. iv.) be conceived without God. This (by Prop. xv.) is absurd. Therefore, God is the cause of the essence of things. Q.E.D.
Not
This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi. For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the essence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their existence--in a word, God must be called the cause of all things, in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself. This will be made still clearer by the following corollary.
Sonuç
Individual things are nothing but modifications of the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a fixed and definite manner. The proof appears from Prop. xv. and Def. v.
Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), Latince aslından çeviren R. H. M. Elwes.
İlk kez The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, cilt II içinde yayımlandı (London: George Bell and Sons, 1884).
Bu çeviri Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde — 1884 yılında yayımlandığı ülkede — ve telif hakkı süresinin yazarın yaşamı artı 100 yıl veya daha az olduğu her yerde kamu malıdır; çevirmeni 1892 yılında vefat etmiştir.
Birim ayırımları, başlıklar ve notların yerleşimi bu siteye aittir.
Dijital metin: Project Gutenberg eBook #3800